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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the behavior of subjects in interdependent security experiments which exhibit strategic 
complementarity. In these experiments, subjects decide whether to pay to mitigate the risk of a loss, but the exact risk 
depends on the actions of other subjects. Two ranked equilibria exist, and the efficient equilibrium is for all agents to 
pay for the mitigation. Subjects in the interdependent security experiments rarely coordinate on the efficient 
equilibrium. Coordination is slightly more common in similar coordination games without the risk mitigation decision. 
The experiments also compare the effectiveness of two policies at inducing higher levels of mitigation.
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     1 Introduction
Critical mass games are binary choice games with multiple equilibria where once a threshold of
agents commit to an action, all other agents ﬁnd it in their best interest to also take that action
(Schelling, 1978). Examples from Schelling include urban segregation and faculty seminar partic-
ipation. This idea has recently been applied to the problem of risk mitigation when there are risk
interdependencies (Kunreuther and Heal, 2003). In interdependent security (IDS) games, agents
decide whether or not to pay to mitigate the risk of a loss, but the exact risk of a loss depends on
the actions of other agents. Kunreuther and Heal’s leading example is the decision by airlines to
screen passengers and bags for bombs. Other applications include computer security and wildﬁre
protection decisions (Shafran, 2008).
When the risk interdependencies exhibit strategic complementarity, the games can have two or
more Pareto-ranked pure strategy Nash equilibria.1 The IDS games analyzed here have exactly two
pure strategy equilibria, one equilibrium where no one invests in risk mitigation and a preferable
equilibrium where all agents invest. Coordination failure occurs when agents choose not to invest
in risk mitigation, and the less desirable equilibrium is achieved.
IDS games combine a traditional coordination game in which individuals unravel the strategic
uncertaintyregardingthe actionsof the otherplayers with adecision based onindividuals’personal
preferences for risk mitigation. The risk mitigation aspect of the game adds a level of complexity to
the game beyond that which has appeared in most coordination game experiments.2 A goal of this
paper is to investigate the effect of the additional complexity caused by the risk mitigation aspect
of the game. To address this, behavior in IDS games is compared to that in a related but simpler
game that does not depend on preferences for risk mitigation. The simpler game is closely related
to many of Schelling’s examples, and variations on it have been widely studied in experiments
starting with Van Huyck et al. (1990).3
Subjects played in one of three variations of an IDS game, designed to test the effectiveness of
two subsidy-based policies at inducing risk mitigation and leading to the preferable equilibrium.
The ﬁrst policy treatment, referred to as symmetric subsidies, offers a partial subsidy to each agent
who chooses to mitigate the risk. The second policy treatment, referred to as asymmetric subsidies,
makes a subset of the agents eligible for full subsidies. This policy is a novel approach to solving
the problem of coordination failure, exploiting the risk interdependencies to induce mitigation
among agents who do not receive a subsidy. By making use of the fact that mitigation is beneﬁcial
without a subsidy once enough agents are mitigating, this policy has the potential to lead to the
preferable equilibrium in a more cost effective manner than the symmetric subsidies. In practice,
asymmetric subsidies can be implemented through the use of “early bird” specials which reward
the ﬁrst agents to act or those who act by a set date.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a simple model of
interdependentsecurity upon which the experimentsare based. Section 3 explainsthe experimental
1See Kunreuther et al. (2007) for an experimental study of IDS games with only one Nash equilibrium.
2Hess et al. (2007) also study IDS coordination games in an experimental setting. As in the experiments presented
here, they ﬁnd that coordination failure is common in simultaneous IDS games.
3See Van Huyck et al. (1991), Van Huyck et al. (1997), Cooper et al. (1992), Straub (1995), Schmidt et al. (2003),
and Devetag (2003) for additional examples of coordination game experiments.
1design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Simple Model of Interdependent Security
Suppose that an agent with wealthY faces some probability of a loss L. The agent chooses between
strategy A (no mitigation) and strategy B (mitigation). Strategy B imposes a certain cost c in return
for a lower probability of experiencing the loss L. The exact probability of a loss depends on the
agent’s choice as well as the choices of the other N  1 agents in the game. Let n 2 0;1;:::;N 1
denote the number of other agents who choose B. Let P(i;n) denote the probability that an agent
incurs a loss where i 2 fA;Bg. Assume P(i;n) has the following form:
P(i;n) =
{
P0 an if i = A
P1 bn if i = B :
Assume that P0 > P1 and 0 < a < b to reﬂect the beneﬁt of risk mitigation. The payoff to an
agent who mitigates is:
Y  c P(B;n)L (1)
The payoff to an agent who does not mitigate is:
Y  P(A;n)L (2)
An agent’s best response is to mitigate if:
[P(A;n) P(B;n)]L > c (3)
Thegamesstudiedinthispaperhavethecharacteristicthat[P(A;0) P(B;0)]L<cand[P(A;N 
1) P(B;N  1)]L > c. Thus, it is a Nash equilibrium for all agents to mitigate and for no agents
to mitigate. Kunreuther and Heal (2003) provide several examples of IDS games that have this
feature. Their leading example is airline security. In their model, airlines choose whether or not
to screen checked bags for bombs. Screening bags incurs a cost but reduces the probability that a
bomb gets on a plane. As is common practice in the industry, airlines only screen bags checked
directly with them. Bags transferred from other airlines are not re-screened. Airlines are therefore
exposed to risk by partner airlines which elect not to screen bags.
Equilibrium selection criteria are necessary to predict which of the two equilibria will occur.
Three selection criteria are considered here, each of which has been to shown to play a role in
equilibrium selection in coordination game experiments. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) deﬁne an
equilibrium as payoff dominant if every agent earns a higher payoff at that equilibrium compared
to all other equilibria. In order for the mitigation equilibrium to be payoff dominant, it must be
the case that Y  c [P1  b(N  1)]L > Y  P0L, or [P0  P1 +b(N  1)]L > c. The condition
(from the previous paragraph) that [P(A;N 1) P(B;N 1)]L > c implies that [P0 P1+b(N 
1) a(N 1)]L > c. Since a(N 1) is positive, the condition [P0 P1+b(N 1)]L > c is always
2Table I: Parameter Values
Treatment Y L c N P0 a P1 b
Baseline $0.30 $0.24 $0.04 7 0.4 0.02 0.38 0.05
Symmetric Subsidies $0.30 $0.24 $0.02 7 0.4 0.02 0.38 0.05
Asymmetric Subsidies $0.30 $0.24 $0.04 5 0.36 0.02 0.28 0.05
met when [P(A;N 1) P(B;N 1)]L > c. Thus, the equilibrium where everyone mitigates is the
payoff dominant equilibrium.
An equilibrium is risk dominant if agents are playing strategies that impose the least risk on
them given their strategic uncertainty about the behavior of the other players (Harsanyi and Selten,
1988). If it is optimal to choose A when each opponent plays A with probability at least 0.5, then
the non-mitigation equilibrium is risk dominant. If it is optimal to choose B when each opponent
plays B with probability at least 0.5, then the mitigation equilibrium is risk dominant. The risk
dominant equilibrium will depend on the speciﬁc values in the game.
Van Huyck et al. (1990) deﬁne the secure equilibrium as that in which agents are playing
the strategy with the highest worst case payoff. Since both a and b are positive, the worst case
payoff for both strategies occurs when no one else mitigates. Given the assumption that [P(A;0) 
P(B;0)]L<c, choosing not to mitigate provides a higher worst case payoff. The equilibrium where
no one mitigates is therefore the secure equilibrium.
3 Experimental Design
Subjects played a sequence of rounds which replicated one of three variations of the model from
Section 2, a baseline game and two policy treatments that tested the effect of symmetric and asym-
metric subsidies. In all three treatments, players received a payment ofY at the start of each round.
There was a chance that they would lose L. Each player could choose between two strategies, A
and B. Strategy B was the risk mitigation strategy. By choosing B, agents paid a small amount (c)
to reduce the chance of a loss.
Table I shows how each parameter was set for each of the three treatments.4 The symmetric
subsidy treatment cuts the cost of mitigation in half from $0.04 to $0.02. The asymmetric subsidy
treatment holds the cost of mitigation at $0.04 but implicity allows two agents to mitigate for free,
resulting in a game with ﬁve players instead of seven.
In all three treatments, the mitigation equilibrium is payoff dominant while the non-mitigation
equilibrium is the secure equilibrium. By increasing the expected payoffs at the mitigation equi-
librium, the symmetric subsidy strengthens the payoff dominance of that equilibrium compared to
the baseline game. Both subsidy treatments reduce the risk associated with mitigating, the sym-
metric subsidy by increasing the expected payoffs from mitigating and the asymmetric subsidy
4Five of the ﬁfteen cohorts did not play the ﬁnal 20 rounds discussed below (three cohorts of the baseline game
and two cohorts of the symmetric subsidy treatment). To hold expected session earnings constant, these cohorts had
all dollar values scaled up by 2.5 times with the other parameters the same.
3Table II: Summary of Treatments - IDS Game
Treatment Choice Cost Number Choosing B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Baseline
A $0.00 40% 38% 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.04 38% 33% 28% 23% 18% 13% 8%
Symmetric Subsidies
A $0.00 40% 38% 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.02 38% 33% 28% 23% 18% 13% 8%
Asymmetric Subsidies
A $0.00 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.04 28% 23% 18% 13% 8%
Table III: Summary of Treatments - Expected Payoffs (In Dollars)
Treatment Choice Number Choosing B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Baseline
A 0.204 0.209 0.214 0.218 0.223 0.228 0.233
B 0.169 0.181 0.193 0.205 0.217 0.229 0.241
Symmetric Subsidies
A 0.204 0.209 0.214 0.218 0.223 0.228 0.233
B 0.189 0.201 0.213 0.225 0.237 0.249 0.261
Asymmetric Subsidies
A 0.214 0.218 0.223 0.228 0.233
B 0.193 0.205 0.217 0.229 0.241
by reducing the probability of the worst outcomes to 0. As a result, the mitigation equilibrium
is less “risky” with respect to the strategic uncertainty of the game under both subsidy treatments
compared to the baseline game.
Because of the risk interdependencies, the exact probability of a loss depended on two factors:
whether the player chose B and how many other players chose B. A table showed the players the
exact chance of a loss for every possible outcome. Table II shows the information provided to
the players for each of the three treatments. The percentages in the table indicate the probability
that a player incurred a loss given their choice and the number of other players who chose B. The
expected payoffs (in dollars) for the three treatments are shown in Table III, although players were
not given this information.
After all choices were made each round, a random lottery number determined whether or not
subjects who chose A and B incurred a loss. Players then received full information on the outcome
of the round. Players were told how many other players chose B, the probability of a loss that
corresponded with the outcome, the random lottery number drawn for the round, and whether they
lost or not. From the information given, they could also determine whether they would have lost
had they chosen the other strategy.
Each cohort played only one treatment. After playing 15 rounds of the original game, cohorts
4Table IV: Summary of Treatments - Pure Coordination Game
Treatment Choice Cost Number Choosing B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Baseline
A $0.00 40% 38% 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.00 54% 49% 44% 39% 34% 29% 24%
Symmetric Subsidies
A $0.00 40% 38% 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.00 47% 42% 37% 32% 27% 22% 17%
Asymmetric Subsidies
A $0.00 36% 34% 32% 30% 28%
B $0.00 44% 39% 34% 29% 24%
played a new game with the same expected payoffs but where choice B was free.5 The percentages
corresponding to choice B were increased so that the expected value of choice B remained the same
as in the previous game even though the choice was now free. The percentages corresponding to
choice A remained unchanged. Table IV shows the new game for each of the three treatments.
In the ﬁrst 15 rounds (the IDS game), subjects face strategic uncertainty combined with a risk
mitigation choice. Conditional on the choices of the other subjects, strategy B always offers a
smaller chance of a loss in return for a certain cost. After the strategic uncertainty is resolved, the
preferred choices depends on an individual’s value for risk mitigation. In rounds 11-25 (the pure
coordination game), both choices are free, so individuals should prefer whichever strategy leads to
the lowest probability of a loss. In this simpler game, subjects still face strategic uncertainty but
the risk mitigation choice has been removed. The purpose of these rounds is to test if the simpler
game leads to higher levels of coordination on the preferred equilibrium.
Because subjects played the IDS game ﬁrst, there is a potential ordering effect in the pure
coordination game rounds. After playing 10 rounds of the pure coordination game, cohorts played
an additional ten rounds of the original IDS game. These last ten rounds will be used to test
whether differences in behavior between the original game and the pure coordination game can be
attributed to experience or to the differences between the games.6
Ninety-ﬁve participants were recruited from undergraduate classes at the University of Col-
orado. Five cohorts of seven people played the baseline game, ﬁve cohorts of seven played the
symmetric policy treatment, and ﬁve cohorts of ﬁve played the asymmetric policy treatment. As
an incentive to show up, students were offered a small amount of extra credit in one of their eco-
nomics or business classes. In addition, students were told that they would earn between $5 and
$12 for their participation in the experiments. A session lasted for 30 minutes, so participants
should have expected to earn an hourly rate between $10 and $24. The average actual earnings in
the thirty minute session were $9.07.
The experiments took place in a computer lab on campus. All instructions were read aloud at
the beginning of the session, and subjects could follow along from their computer terminal. The
5Five of the ﬁfteen cohorts participated in sessions where only the initial 15 rounds were played.
6At the end of the session, players’ risk preferences were measured using a procedure similar to that used in Holt
and Laury (2002). These measures of risk aversion did not have a statistically signiﬁcant effect on individual behavior.
5full text of the instructions are available upon request from the author. Before the ﬁrst round,
subjects answered two questions about the game through their computer to demonstrate that they
understood how payoffs were determined.
4 Results
Figure 1 shows the sequence of aggregate outcomes in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen rounds for each of the ﬁfteen
cohorts. The ﬁrst column shows the results for the baseline game, the second column for the sym-
metric subsidy game, and the third column for the asymmetric subsidy game. It is clear from this
ﬁgure that a higher percentage of subjects chose B in the symmetric subsidy treatment compared to
the baseline game, although it is not as clear if there is a similar effect for the asymmetric subsidy
treatment.
Most of the ﬁrst ﬁfteen rounds did not result in either of the predicted Nash equilibria, and
play did not appear to converge toward either of the equilibria. The lack of convergence to either
equilibrium can partly be explained by the fact that subjects condition future choices on the ex
post lottery outcomes of previous rounds.7 Subjects were likely to switch their choice immediately
following a loss, regardless of whether it was the best choice in expectation. To demonstrate
this, Table V shows the results of a probit where the dependent variable is 1 if the subject chose
strategy B. Reported values are the marginal effects for a change in the variable with standard
errors adjusted for correlation of observations across rounds for each subject.
AandLoss is a dummy variable that is 1 if the individual chose A and lost in the previous round.
BandLoss is a dummy variable that is 1 if the individual chose B and lost in the previous round.
BandNoLoss is a dummy variable that is 1 if the individual chose B and did not lose in the previous
round. Coefﬁcients on these three variables are relative to the omitted variable, individuals who
chose A and did not lose in the previous round. The dummy variable BestResponse is set equal
to 1 if strategy B was the best response to the choices of the other players in the previous round.8
Subjects’ earnings so far in the experiment are included to test for income effects in the later
rounds. Other explanatory variables included are gender, year in school (with 0 representing ﬁrst
year college students), dummies for each of the subsidy treatments, and a dummy for business or
economics majors.
Subjects choosing A were about 9% more likely to choose B following a loss, signiﬁcant at
the 5% level. To examine the effect of incurring a loss when choosing B, the difference between
BandLoss and BandNoLoss indicates that subjects were about 7% less likely to choose B immedi-
ately following a loss (although this difference is not statistically signiﬁcant). It is also noteworthy
that subjects were no more likely to choose B immediately following rounds where B was the best
response to the other players’ choices. These results suggest that the salience of experiencing a
loss plays an important part in individual decision-making and may inhibit convergence toward
either equilibrium.
7A similar result is found in stochastic prisoner’s dilemma games by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006).
8In Table V, the BestResponse variable assumes that subjects are risk neutral. Alternatively, the best response could
be calculated using the estimates of risk aversion from the Holt and Laury (2002) test. The variable is not statistically
signiﬁcant using either approach.
6Figure 1: Aggregate Outcomes By Cohort
7Table V: The Effect of Prior Outcomes
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8Table VI: Pure Coordination Game vs. IDS Game
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A small income effect is apparent from Table V, with subjects 2% less likely to choose B for
every dollar in accumulated earnings. Given the levels of earnings in the ﬁrst 15 rounds, this effect
is very small in magnitude. The symmetric policy has a strong positive effect on mitigation while
the effect of the asymmetric policy is small and insigniﬁcant. Section 4.2 discusses these treatment
effects in more detail.
4.1 The IDS Game vs. the Pure Coordination Game
Thepurposeofthepurecoordinationgameroundswastotestifthereducedcomplexityofthegame
results in outcomes closer to the equilibrium predictions. Because subjects played these rounds
after playing the IDS game, it is possible that differences observed between the pure coordination
game and the IDS game are the result of experience and are not related to the change in the game.
To distinguish between these two hypotheses, subjects played an additional ten rounds of the IDS
game after playing the pure coordination game.
Out of 100 rounds of the pure coordination game, equilibrium was reached ten times, a higher
percentage (10%) than in the ﬁrst set of rounds of the IDS game (about 3%). When subjects re-
turned to the IDS game at the end of the session, equilibrium was reached 4 times (4%), about
the same frequency as in the ﬁrst set of IDS rounds. To further investigate this, a variable dif f =
min(nb;N nb) was constructed representing the difference between actual outcomes and the clos-
est equilibrium outcome, where nb is the number of subjects who chose B. Table VI shows the
results of a regression of dif f on a dummy variable for the pure coordination game and a dummy
variable for the later risk mitigation rounds with ﬁxed cohort effects and allowing for ﬁrst order
autocorrelation of the error terms.
The pure coordination game coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, indicating
that the number choosing B in the pure coordination game is closer to one of the two equilibria
compared to the original IDS game. In contrast, there is no signiﬁcant difference between the ﬁnal
IDS rounds and the original IDS rounds. Outcomes moved closer to one of the two equilibria when
subjects played the simpler pure coordination game, then moved back when subjects returned to
the original game. This leads to the conclusion that the additional complexity of the IDS game
partly explains the lack of convergence to either equilibria and that the changed behavior in the
9Table VII: Treatment Effects
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Subjects Choosing B
(1) (2) (3)
Symmetric Policy 0.257 0.299 0.257
(0.031) (0.034) (0.071)
Asymmetric Policy 0.062 0.088 0.062
(0.031) (0.038) (0.071)
Observations 225 225 225
Standard errors in parentheses
** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
pure coordination game is a result of the reduced complexity and not the effect of experience.
4.2 The Effect of Symmetric and Asymmetric Subsidies
To analyze the effect of the two subsidy treatments, Table VII reports estimation results of the
effect of each treatment on the percent choosing B, using outcomes in the ﬁrst 15 rounds. The ﬁrst
columnisanOLSregression, ignoringanyautocorrelationwithincohortsorheteroscedacityacross
cohorts. Column 2 allows for ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the error terms as well as groupwise
heteroscedacity. Column 3 is a random effects model, in which the error is made up of a cohort-
speciﬁc error term and a random error term, still allowing for ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the
random error term.
It is clear from Table VII that the symmetric subsidy treatment has a strong, positive, statisti-
cally signiﬁcant effect on the percentage of subjects choosing B in each round. About 26% more
subjects (almost two more subjects) choose B in each round compared to the baseline game. From
Columns 1 and 2, there is some evidence that a statistically signiﬁcant higher percentage of sub-
jects chose B in the asymmetric subsidy treatment compared to the baseline game. However, we
cannot conclude whether this higher percentage reﬂects the effect of the treatment or is simply a
random cohort effect. Furthermore, even if there is a treatment effect, it is small in magnitude
compared to the effect of the symmetric treatment. Between 6% and 9% more subjects choose B
compared to the baseline game.
Although the symmetric subsidy treatment is clearly more effective at inducing higher per-
centages of individuals to mitigate the risk, that does not necessarily imply that it is the more
cost effective solution. To analyze cost effectiveness, the two freebies in the asymmetric subsidy
treatment are also included in the mitigation totals. Looking at the overall levels of mitigation
and overall costs of the two policy treatments, the symmetric subsidy treatment results in slightly
higher levels of mitigation for a slightly higher cost. For the symmetric treatment, B was chosen
329 times in the ﬁrst ﬁfteen rounds, costing $6.58 in subsidies. The cost of the subsidies in asym-
metric subsidy treatment is ﬁxed at $0.08 per round, resulting in a total cost of $6.00. Altogether,
choice B was chosen 162 times in addition to the 150 implicit B choices corresponding to the full
10subsidies. Thus, the symmetric subsidy treatment resulted in a 5.4% increase in mitigation for a
9.7% increase in cost.
The number of subjects mitigating per dollar spent is slightly higher under the asymmetric
subsidy treatment. The mean level of mitigation per dollar spent is 51.86 under the asymmetric
subsidy scheme compared to 50 under the symmetric subsidy scheme. When the two full subsidies
are included in the mitigation totals, the asymmetric subsidy outperforms the symmetric subsidy
in cost effectiveness, although the difference is not statistically signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusions
This paper compared interdependent security games to coordination games without a risk mitiga-
tion decision. The IDS games played at the beginning of each session involved a costly low-risk
choice and a free high-risk choice. As a result, a player’s attitudes toward risk come into play in ad-
dition to the strategic uncertainty that is present in all coordination games. Equilibrium outcomes
were uncommon in these rounds. Playing a game with the same expected payoffs but without the
risk mitigation decision resulted in outcomes closer to an equilibrium, although not necessarily
the efﬁcient equilibrium. Returning to the original game moved outcomes away from equilibrium,
indicating that the added complexity of the original game is in part responsible for the lack of
convergence to an equilibrium.
The paper also tested the effectiveness of two policies at inducing mitigation in IDS games.
The results suggest that the ﬁnancial incentive offered under the symmetric subsidy policy has a
signiﬁcant positive impact on the number of subjects who mitigate although it does not lead to the
efﬁcient level of mitigation in most cases. It is less clear whether the asymmetric subsidy induces
un-subsidized subjects to mitigate via the risk interdependencies. A small effect is observed which
is not always statistically signiﬁcant. In terms of cost effectiveness, both policies are about the
same with the traditional subsidy leading to slightly higher levels of mitigation for a slightly higher
cost.
It is clear from the data that subjects react to ex post outcomes in previous rounds when making
their decisions. After a loss occurs, agents are signiﬁcantly more likely to mitigate if they were not
already mitigating. One explanation for this is that the importance of reducing risk becomes clear
only when the consequences of not reducing risk are experienced. Further research is necessary on
the impact of prior outcomes on behavior in IDS games.
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